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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.201
0970-3896Abstract In this conversation with Ramesh Ramanathan, social entrepreneur and founder of
Janaadhar, we explore the challenges of providing affordable housing to the “base of the pyr-
amid” e the economically weaker segment, which would address the need of a largely under-
served market in India. The challenges include the high cost and the difficulty in acquiring land
in urban areas, dealing with anachronistic government regulations, getting bank loans, and
acquiring customers from the target segment. The conversation highlights how Janaadhar
was able to grapple with these challenges, sometimes by innovating, at other times by learning
from its own mistakes and finally by maintaining a dynamic balance between the “head and the
heart” that enabled it to reconcile two contradictory objectives of leveraging market princi-
ples to achieve a social objective.Context note
Professor C K Prahalad (2004), in his book The Fortune at
the Bottom of the Pyramid1 put forth a powerful hypothesis
that worldwide the four billion people living at bottom ofin
ian Institute of Management
yramid: C K Prahalad, 2004,
4.06.002the economic pyramid, defined by per capita annual in-
come being less than or equal to US$ 1500, represented a
profitable market, which was hitherto under-served. These
markets were unorganized, had local idiosyncrasies, were
difficult to reach, and did not have many good quality
products. Therefore, bottom of the pyramid (BoP) markets
would not deliver high margins, and organizations needed
to build scale in order to make significant profits. Moreover,
in order to be profitable, organizations needed to be
innovative as well as highly efficient and that would require
a fundamental change in their business model.
Low cost housing possibly represents one such BoP op-
portunity in India. According to the 11th Five Year Plan
184 S. Mukherji(2007e2012), the estimated housing gap in India was
26.53 million,2 99% of which was in the economically
weaker segment (EWS) or lower income groups (LIG).3
As per the 2001 census, 61.8 million people were esti-
mated to be living in slums, and close to 70% of all house-
holds lived in two or less than two room shelters, indicating
a huge potential in serving the low income population.
According to industry expert Jerry Rao,4 if one were able
to build houses that were priced between INR 1e1.5
million, it would be possible to sell a million homes in urban
India. Back of the envelope calculations indicated that it
was possible to get land at INR 150-300 per square foot. If
the houses were kept small, standardized, and if they could
be built fast enough, it was possible to peg construction
costs to INR 800 per square foot. Thus, keeping a reason-
able margin, the price for such houses would be less than
INR 2000 per square foot, which implied that for a million
rupees, one could buy a house measuring 450e500 square
feet. Mr. Rao noted5
If you fix a price point and work backwards, you will get
a viable business model for the BoP. This is what Nano
did in automobiles and Nirma did in washing powder. If
you go back to the 50s, Brijmohan Munjal did the same
with bicycles. He realized that cycles could become a
mass product rather than being a product for the elite.
You don’t see any such example in real estate today,
though Homex has done it in Mexico. My calculations
showed that it was possible to do the same in India.
Despite such numbers, one does not see many players
from the real estate sector venturing into this segment. This
is because of a large number of demand and supply side
factors. First, there is an undersupply of residential land in
urban India because of government regulations. Most land in
India is notified as agricultural land and it takes a long time,
often close to three years, to acquire such land and convert it
to residential land. Moreover, it is often difficult to establish
who the rightful owner of the land is. Sincemost land records
aremaintainedmanually, land records have to be reconciled
at multiple places such as the offices of the village, the sub-
registrar, and the tehsildar. It is not unusual to have simul-
taneous claims of ownership by multiple people.
At high borrowing rates, such delays could lead to sig-
nificant cost escalation. However, so long as the consumers
are economically well-off, one could say that they would
not complain because market prices of the houses would
continue to escalate at a rapid rate, more than compen-
sating for the high interest costs. Therefore, such houses
become good investment options for the customers. Thus,
while it is difficult to build and sell houses at low cost that2 Report of the technical group, 11th Five Year Plan, estimation of
urban housing shortage <http://mhupa.gov.in/ministry/housing/
HOUSINGSHORTAGE-REPT.pdf>.
3 EWS and LIG are defined as households having monthly income
less INR 3500 and between INR 3500e6000 respectively.
4 Based on Jerry Rao’s lecture at IIM Bangalore in December, 2011.
Mr. Rao is the founder of Value and Budget Housing Corporation, an
organization involved in building low cost houses.
5 Jerry Rao’s lecture at IIM Bangalore in December, 2011.need very fast turnaround, it is relatively easy to sell
houses in the middle to upper end of the market.
A second related problem arises from the fact that price
of land is extremely high within the city. Therefore, if the
total cost has to be kept low, low cost houses can only be
built at the periphery of the city. Given the inadequate
public transport inmost Indian cities, staying and commuting
from peri-urban locations turns out to be a big challenge for
the potential customer. Therefore, it becomes necessary for
the builder of low cost housing to also build a school and
provide for other essential services such as a clinic and a
grocery store in order to make it a viable proposition for the
customer. On the one hand, these would add to the cost of
the building: on the other, providing some of these services,
especially a school, would entail a larger number of regula-
tory clearances, which would in turn lead to further
bureaucratic delays. Compared to this, a residential com-
plex constructed within the city, need not provide such basic
amenities because such services can be assumed to operate
in the vicinity of those locations. Further, commuting would
not be a big challenge for the residents, first because they
are within the city and second, because they are likely to
possess their own vehicles for commuting.
It can be expected that people from the EWS and LIG will
need to take loans from banks in order to pay for the
houses. This becomes the source of the third problem e
most of them find it difficult to get housing loans sanctioned
by banks, because they do not meet the eligibility criteria
of the banks in terms of either their net worth or the
financial status of their employer organization. While
eligibility criteria vary between banks, anecdotal evidence
indicates that it is difficult for someone running a small
business (such as a beauty parlour in a slum) to get a loan of
INR 0.4 million. For employees to get a loan, banks often
require that the borrower be a permanent employee for at
least three years in an organization that has a minimum
paid up capital of INR 30 million, has been in existence for
at least five years, has at least 100 employees, and provides
superannuation benefit to its employees e conditions that
would be difficult for many of the borrowers to satisfy since
they might be working in the unorganized sector or small
scale industries.
The fourth significant challenge, peculiar to the housing
segment, comes in the process of acquiring the customer
from the targetted segment. Since there is a shortage of
supply and high demand for houses in the market, even the
economically well-off are attracted towards purchasing low
cost houses that are meant for the EWS and LIG, more often
than not, as an investment option, in anticipation of price
escalation. While low cost houses are small in size and
located far away from the centre of the city, they are
comparable in their structural quality to any of the other
houses. Moreover, they provide all the functional amenities
that can be expected in houses meant for the middle in-
come group, such as compound walls, indoor toilets, and
kitchens. Thus, even though they are meant for the EWS/
LIG, the middle income group is drawn to them. This group
has greater ability to get loans from banks and often own
vehicles for commuting, thereby overcoming many of the
challenges that the EWS/LIG customers face. Thus,
acquiring them as customers becomes an easier option for
the low cost housing provider, and unless the provider has a
Affordable housing 185strong reason to keep out people other than those from the
EWS/LIG from buying the houses, the economic profile of
the final customer becomes significantly better than that of
the intended customer e those from the bottom of the
pyramid.
Thus, it becomes evident that to target the BoP segment
with a product such as low cost housing, it is not enough to
focus on the price of the product alone. The product/ser-
vice provider needs to get involved in a variety of other
activities and innovate on multiple fronts to overcome
market-failures in complementary services. Anticipating
this, Prahalad (2004) had proposed a framework (see
Fig. 1). He noted that
Serving the BoP markets is not an exercise in serving
existing markets better or more efficiently, neither is it
about selling cheap and low quality products. Nor can a
firm do this alone. Multiple players are needed to build
the BoP infrastructure e create buying power, shape
aspirations, improve access and grow healthy markets.
All four elements of the model will demand innovation in
technology, business models and management
processes.
Ramesh Ramanathan, a veteran in the domain of social
entrepreneurship, founded Janaadhar, a not-for-profit en-
terprise with the aim of providing good quality houses at
low prices to the under-served population. Janaadhar-
Shubha was started as a project on the outskirts of Ban-
galore in 2010 and by the middle of 2012, 480 single
bedroom flats of 400 square feet were constructed and sold
as phase one of the project, at a price of INR 0.5 million
each. In phase two that is under construction now,
Janaadhar plans to build 648 double bedroom flats. Cus-
tomers of Janaadhar are families with monthly household
incomes of around INR 15,000 employed as factory workers,
security guards, household help, autorickshaw drivers,Figure 1 Framework to address the BoP segment. This figure
has been adapted from the book “Fortune at the Base of the
Pyramid” by C K Prahlad1.hospital nurses and petty shop owners.6 Thus, Janaadhar
seems to have overcome the myriad challenges in providing
the low cost houses to the EWS/LIG. We discuss with
Ramesh Ramanathan as to how these challenges were
successfully negotiated.
In the beginning of the interview, Mr. Ramanathan ex-
plains how owning a house was essential to the wellbeing of
the economically underprivileged and the realization that
there was a market failure in that segment led to the
founding of Janaadhar. Having run Janalakshmi Financial
Services, Mr. Ramanathan and his team had acquired a deep
understanding of this segment and thus Janaadhar was a
related diversification that would create greater value for
the economically underprivileged. Moreover, since they had
created a financially viable model in Janalakshmi Financial
Services, they had the confidence to create another social
enterprise e an organization that aimed to serve the needs
of the poor by embracing market principles, in a financially
sustainable manner. However, as Mr. Ramanathan explains
in the latter part of the interview, their assumption about
the commonality of customers between Janalakshmi and
Janaadhar was misplaced largely because the conventional
wisdom about how lower income groups finance their
houses turned out to be different from reality. This possibly
points to a few important lessons about social entrepre-
neurship e first, it always helps to have an intimate un-
derstanding and first-hand experience about the customer
segment before embarking on the business; second, con-
ventional wisdom often turns out to be false because of the
specificity of the contexts, and any kind of generalization
about customers and markets in this segment would have
limited use for the social entrepreneur.
As we progress through the interview, it becomes clear
that Janaadhar innovated on multiple fronts in order to
overcome the various challenges that came its way. If there
is one theme that runs across all these innovations, it is
about a dynamic balance that Mr. Ramanathan sought be-
tween what he calls “the two levels e the head and the
heart”. While Prahalad’s work (2004) had brought the BoP
markets to the attention of commercial enterprises, critics
such as Karnani (2007)7 pointed out that targetting the BoP
purely for profits might do more harm than good to the
poor, given their inherent vulnerabilities. Therefore, en-
terprises such as Janaadhar that create products or services
for the poor need to constantly negotiate the tradeoff be-
tween financially viability and positive social impact. In
case of Janaadhar, this becomes apparent in their selection
of partners, some of the operational choices that they had
to make, the specific organization form that they adopted,
and their human resource policy. In the later part of the
interview we ask Mr Ramanathan about his future plans, the
challenges that he anticipates in scaling his organization
and what some of the policy enablers might be. In response,
he explains the crucial role that government needs to play
if they want to bridge the housing gap in India, and the role6 “Janaadhar Value Housing Project Completes Phase I”, Business
Standard, 22nd August, 2011.
7 “The Mirage of Marketing to the Bottom of the Pyramid“, A Kar-
nani, California Management Review, Summer 2007.
186 S. Mukherjian academic institution such as IIM Bangalore can play in
the process.
Based on the discussion, it seems that given the nascent
stage of the domain of social entrepreneurship in general
and affordable housing in particular, social entrepreneurs
like Mr. Ramanathan need to be perennially in an explor-
atory and learning mode. Mistakes will be made, but Mr.
Ramanathan views these mistakes as “tuition fees” for the
learning process. However, it is the purpose of the organi-
zation that enables the social enterprises to grapple with
and overcome some of the seemingly insurmountable
challenges. Mr. Ramanathan had started his enterprise to
answer the question whether the driver of market based
institutions could be anything other than greed, and after
spending more than twelve years in this domain, he
emphatically concludes that “purpose eats greed for
lunch”. He is thus confident that it is possible to build en-
terprises with the primary purpose of creating social value
even while adopting market based principles to make such
organizations financially self-sustainable.
India probably needs hundreds of such enterprises to
solve its poverty and sustainability problems because
scholars have opined that there is not going to be any single
solution or a silver bullet to help overcome its problems
(Banerji and Duflo, 2012).8 Therefore we hope that
Janaadhar’s example would inspire many more social en-
trepreneurs to create purpose driven organizations in do-
mains such as education, healthcare, and energy services
intended for the economically underprivileged.
In conversation with Ramesh Ramanathan,
Chairman, Janalakshmi Social Services and
JanaadharRamesh Ramanathan is a social entrepreneur, and works on urban issues in India. He is co-founder of Janaagraha
Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, a non-profit focussed on transforming quality of life in urban India. He is also
Chairman of Janalakshmi Social Services, a not-for-profit social business holding company that has promoted enter-
prises in urban affordable housing (Janaadhar India (Pvt) Ltd.) and urban financial inclusion (Janalakshmi Financial
Services, an urban micro-finance institution).
Ramesh Ramanathan works closely with government on urban issues. He is the National Technical Advisor, Government
of India for the Jawarharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, the country’s flagship urban mission. Prior to his
social initiatives, Mr Ramanathan held leadership positions with Citibank in New York and London, in the bank’s capital
markets business.
An MBA from Yale University and a Certified Financial Analyst (CFA) from the Association of Investment Management &
Research (AIMR), in 2007, Ramesh Ramanathan was chosen as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum.
Janaadhar
Janaadhar is a company that aims to address the home-ownership aspirations of the under-served urban population by
providing a complete housing solution e well designed, high-quality homes. Janaadhar has been floated by Jana Urban
Foundation e a Section 25 Not-For-Profit company e for implementing budget housing projects. Janaadhar brings
together the expertise of Jana Urban Foundation and Sterling Developers Private Limited.
Source: www.janaagraha.org; www.janaadhar.com8 Poor Economics: A V Banerjee & E Duflo, Random House, 2011.The interview was conducted by Prof Sourav Mukherji and
Ramana Tadepalli. Ramana Tadepalli is Chief Operating
Officer, IIMB-Century Real Estate Research Initiative, IIM
Bangalore.
Sourav Mukherji (SM) & Ramana Tadepalli (RT): On
behalf of the Indian Institute ofManagement Bangalore,
thank you for speaking to us. I would like to begin by
asking, what was the motivation behind the setting up
of Janaadhar? How do you see affordable housing in the
larger context of the many social challenges our coun-
try faces and how did you deal with this challenge?
Ramesh Ramanathan (RR): The early experience
started in Janalakshmi (see box on Janalakshmi). Our
aspiration in Janalakshmi was to be a customer centric
organization, trying to provide solutions to the issues
faced by our customers. About six years ago we
discovered that 70% of our customers in Janalakshmi
did not have their own housing and were living in
rental housing. Further, they were paying extremely
high rents, yet living in poor quality houses. It struck
us that it was paradoxical to talk about providing
financial services and not recognize the big challenge
of housing because that’s the starting point of building
one’s life in a city. Therefore we asked ourselves: Why
is the market not working for this segment? There is
clearly a market that is working for middle income and
premium housing. Moreover, this category was not the
extremely low, economically weaker section but the
in-between aspirational poor who were struggling but
were taking responsibility for their life. When we
asked real estate developers in Bangalore why they
would not build for this customer segment, the answerwe got was that their entire business model was built
around mortgage financing or take-out financing. Their
existing customers had the ability to get a mortgage
from an organization such as HDFC and bring their own
financing.
Janalakshmi is a social business that embraces market principles while pursuing a social objective. To accomplish this,
Janalakshmi has been designed in a two-tier structure: for-profit operating companies for investors, which includes
Janalakshmi Financial Services, a for-profit NBFC serving the urban under-served; and a not-for-profit holding company
called Janasslakshmi Social Services in which promoter stakes are held. Funds in Janalakshmi Social Services can only
be used to address social issues. Janalakshmi Financial Services has the promoter stake in the not-for-profit entity
Janalakshmi Social Services. Source: www.janalakshmi.com
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enough to give mortgages to customers such as a
vegetable vendor or an autorickshaw driver. So we
decided to step in there because we understood this
customer base. We had a credit appetite for them and
we were willing to provide the back end support to the
real estate developers by providing the mortgage for
our customer base.
However, the second part of the answer was that while
they understood how to deliver real estate projects,
they did not want to take on the lower end of the
spectrum as it was a different ball game. Construction
specifications for this segment were different and
commercial real estate developers were not keen to
get into that area. We concluded that the only way to
solve this problem in a credible operational way was to
set up a stand-alone company which took up affordable
housing development. We knew that there was a
reputational risk issue that we had to consider. We did
not know how to do real estate work and it is a messy
industry! However, we decided that we could not be
worried about whether this would taint us. None of this
hand-wringing was relevant to those who needed the
housing, which was not only unavailable, but also had
no visibility of getting addressed. Ultimately it was a
question of what we choose to do and how we choose to
operate in that space.
SM/RT: How did you get started?
RR:We did not know the business. So we had to bite the
bullet and figure out how to deliver. We approached
some reputed real estate developers and invited them
to be co-promoters. We were willing to give them eq-
uity in return. They brought in domain expertise and
business knowledge, while we were to bring in cus-
tomers, financing, mortgage and so on. Sterling De-
velopers, one of the larger developers in Bangalore,
readily agreed. They felt that we had a noble vision and
were doing something that they themselves wanted to
but could not do for various reasons. Our catchment
area for customers was the Hosur industrial belt, nurses
in Narayana Hrudayalaya, the blue collar employees in
Biocon and so on. We had approached all of these
people. In one of those early discussions, Dr Devi Shetty
(of Narayana Hrudayalaya) said, listen, do you under-
stand how to construct this? At that point we realized
that the core competence of real estate developers lay
in land acquisition, building plan sanctions, connecting
with housing finance companies and so on. But there is
a different core competence required to actually
construct! He suggested that we bring on board Man-
ohar Shetty, his brother-in-law who had built theNarayana Hrudayalaya buildings, and who also under-
stood that we had a higher purpose. So, Manohar Shetty
formed the third leg of the project. We gave both Mr.
Shetty and Sterling Developers equity stake though
neither had asked for it.
Next, we had to buy the land. That process took
another two years because land acquisition is hard and
we wanted everything to be above board. We had to
make sure that the location was correct, with good
access to main roads and other necessary infrastruc-
ture, but it was difficult to get appropriate land par-
cels. In our experience, the entire transaction of
purchasing land was the reverse of what is in the public
narrative about the savvy urban guy versus the innocent
villager. In India, we do not get the land documents for
verification since we do not have a title regime. The
way to do verification is to do 25 years of legal due
diligence. But you don’t get the legal documents till
you pay an advance. So we paid the first transaction
advance of Rs 25 lakh for the legal due diligence. There
were some 23 owners to the land and a lot of questions
came up during the legal due diligence, at the end of
which we found that we could not go ahead with the
transaction. We had to write off that money. This is
where people like Sterling Developers were very helpful
because they know this business. At some point, they
advised us to walk away from it. It appeared that
affordable housing and real estate development could
not commingle since the latter had a different code of
functioning. Along the way, Manohar Shetty, our con-
struction partner too moved on.
Eventually we found another piece of land in the same
Hosur Road industrial belt since 6000e7000 of our
30,000 customers (at that time) were in an 8e10 km
radius of that area. We completed the diligence pro-
cesses e more cautiously this time e and it seemed like
a good transaction. Next, we had to find the money to
buy the land. At rupees one crore (10 million) an acre
we had to raise Rs 12 crores for 12 acres. By that time
we already had our first round of investors at Jana-
lakshmi. They were three social investors e the Michael
and Susan Dell foundation (MSDF), which is the personal
foundation of the founders of Dell; Bellwether, which is
the financial inclusion venture capital fund based out of
Hyderabad; and Lok Capital started by Rajeev Lal of
Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC)
and a few others. The Michael and Susan Dell Founda-
tion said that they would be interested in supporting
this initiative. The offer of support from MSDF was
welcome because even though we wanted to do this in
a commercially viable way, it was going to take time
and it would be useful to have social venture funding as
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a grant for land acquisition.
This was post the 2008 financial crisis when the real
estate sector was heating up in India. There was lot of
speculative money going into real estate and the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was taking steps to curb this
trend. But the collateral damage was on affordable
housing. As a result of the RBI directives, real estate
developers could not buy land with loans any more.
Land had to be bought with equity capital. That
directive from the RBI came exactly at the time we
were looking to buy this land and we had no equity
capital in Janaadhar. Even if you raised equity capital,
there was no domestic market to put equity in, and
especially not in a newly incubated company. Further,
according to the directives, foreign direct investment
(FDI) had to be minimum 5 million dollars. But we
didn’t need that much money. To our good luck MSDF
gave us a grant which covered land acquisition plus
registration costs.
Janaadhar, however, was structured as a for-profit
company. From an ownership standpoint, we had set
it up similar to Janalakshmi e a two-tier structure with
the primary promoter being a not-for-profit section 25
holding company, and other entities/promoters holding
stakes on a different basis. I don’t have any personal
stake, but Jana Foundation, our sec 25 holding com-
pany is one of the promoters and at that time I was very
clear that we would have only a social agenda e I did
not personally want to make money for any inclusion
work that I did. So we created this two tier structure,
the idea being that eventually, when these companies
do well, the returns from the promoters’ stake that are
held in Jana Foundation will be ploughed back into
philanthropic work. While it is modelled on the Tata
Sons structure, it is simpler e they have three tiers to
their holding structures, while ours has only two tiers.
But we did not want to burden other promoters with
the same baggage. Our message to the other entities/
promoters such as Sterling Developers was that they
were free to do whatever they wanted with their
money. So this was the structure we created.
As far as the MSDF grant to Janaadhar was concerned,
we had an operational issue to deal with: the compli-
cation here is that there is no structure in India for a
grant to come into a for-profit company because grants
can either come into trusts or societies or section 25
companies for which you get a Foreign Contribution
Regulation Act (FCRA) (2010) clearance.
Before we could work to address this issue, things
started snowballing. Our bank account received a
transfer of 2 million dollars from MSDF who had to
transfer the funds before the end of the year. We had
to explain the basis of this foreign exchange to the bank
and get an approval from the “appropriate authority”.
Since this was a foreign grant from MSDF but into a for-
profit company, there was a regulatory gap as FCRA was
not applicable in that case. To address this gap of
getting approval from an unstated appropriate author-
ity, we wrote to the Ministry of Finance, and thanks to
the guidance by a clear-headed and decisive jointsecretary K. P. Krishnan we got an approval within 10
days e with everything above board. There is now a
precedent and a process available in India for for-profit
companies to get foreign currency grants.
So we got the money and finally we bought the land.
This is a long answer to your first question e to explain
how we can develop and provide a solution to the
affordable housing need of our core customer base. The
subsequent two and a half year period was a major
learning one for us. We did many things right but we
also did some things wrong.
SM/RT: Given your strong social orientation, was it
difficult to get partners who were equally socially
oriented?
RR: No, we were very clear. They aligned with us
because of the fact that we were taking ownership over
building socially oriented, affordable housing institu-
tionally. This was something that they could not do in
their own organizations for many reasons. They could
help in such a venture and it was also a commercial
transaction. I was not making an argument only of the
heart. Janaadhar was set up as a social business and
that was something that they were keen on ensuring.
For me personally, I am very clear that when I operate,
I operate at two levels. At the level of the heart, we
should not lose sight of the social reason for our exis-
tence e who the customer is, why we are building this
and what the end goal is. But then, when it comes to
the operating entity, every subsequent decision we
make has to be made in a commercially viable way, in a
way that builds a viable enterprise, over a medium to
long term. We knew that it would not happen overnight
but that was the goal. For our partners it was a way of
participating in a sector that they understood and in
which they were willing to contribute; they were also
getting equity stake in return e it was a winewin. We
also carried out our due diligence. Sterling Developers
were partnered by the best housing finance companies;
we have personally seen their projects e people who
had bought their units were deeply appreciative of the
developer and their credentials.
SM/RT: But you must have had some sense that there
would be a philosophical alignment between you and
them.
RR: Absolutely, and that continues.
Coming back to the question of challenges: As with any
enterprise, when you take up an idea and operation-
alize it, you encounter challenges and at each of those
points you are confronted by a choice. We confronted a
challenge in getting the plan sanctions; it didn’t
happen as we expected. So we had to trifurcate the
twelve acre parcel. We decided to do the one-bedroom
constructions first because the two-bedroom construc-
tions required several kinds of approvals which could
take much longer. We started to build the one-bedroom
units and there we encountered challenges in acquiring
customers, an area in which we thought we would
never have challenges. Our hypothesis when setting up
this company was that the real challenge would be
Affordable housing 189along two dimensions e ensuring that we can deliver at
a reasonable price point and in a reasonable time
frame.
We brought in project management expertise to ensure
that we did not compromise on specifications to save on
costs. We wanted no reduction in the quality because
we know that everybody has an aspiration. Even the
person wanting to buy a one-bedroom unit wants
ceramic tiles, aluminium frames, and so on. We tried to
see how to cut costs in other ways, and the major
consideration was to retain that sense of aspiration and
pride in whatever unit we give. However, our funda-
mental mistake was to build the enterprise assuming
that the engineering, project management, and con-
struction were the key competencies since the cus-
tomers were already there. Why did we make that
mistake? Because we had done some market research
with our existing customers and got a sense that people
liked our idea. People said they were ready to commute
up to 15 kms and spend up to one hour so long as their
children and family were in a safe environment. Our
plan gave them a school and a primary healthcare
centre.
Our target market was customers who had monthly
incomes between 12 and 15,000 rupees. We settled on
that because that was the upper end of our customer
base in Janalakshmi. The rule of thumb in mortgage
finance is that about a third of the monthly household
income could go towards equated monthly instalment
(EMI). So if one were earning Rs 12000 to 15000, Rs 4000
to 5000 is what one would give towards an EMI, which in
turn would get one a mortgage of around Rs 5 lakh. We
thought that if we built the unit at a cost of Rs. 5 lakhs
to 5.5 lakhs including registration cost, the customer
could pay Rs. 50,000 as down-payment, take a loan for
Rs. 5 lakhs and pay an EMI of Rs. 5000. That was the
math and it was completely wrong! Because the
disposable household income, as you go lower in the
economic strata, is not 33%! The formula may sound
reasonable, but it doesn’t always work. Somebody
earning Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 15,000 simply does not have
Rs. 5000 to spare.
The second major mistake we made was not realizing
that while middle income people earning about Rs.
30,000 can probably manage two cash flows for a period
of one year e one on house rent for their current
dwelling and the other on the EMI on the loan, it would
not be possible for a household with Rs. 15,000 income.
These two factors implied that those earning Rs. 12,000
to Rs. 15,000 would not be able to afford our houses.
That changed our business proposition fundamentally.
We realized that Janaadhar could not lean on Jana-
lakshmi customers. We had to now figure out how to
acquire a new customer base which the enterprise was
not set up to do. There were so many implications.
First, who would be these new customers and how were
we going to acquire them? Second, why should they buy
from us? Real estate is a complicated sector e you need
to have credibility, you need to have a sense of history.
Nobody knew Janaadhar. In the meantime, thinkingthat we would sell our houses like hot cakes, we had
taken construction financing and started constructing
all six towers. So while we had very good project
management, good cost control and were all set for
completion on time, we had no sales! That resulted in
our having to re-design the sales and marketing effort
of Janaadhar a year or two later. Again, we did not
want to compromise. The easy choice would have been
to just sell the first lot because there were enough
people who came to us. Let me give you two archetypes
e one was a software engineer working in an IT major
for whom the one bedroom unit was a perfect bachelor
pad. But that was not our customer base. So we said
sorry, we are not selling. As another example, we had
an SME factory shop owner who claimed he had 60e70
employees and wanted to buy 20 units for them. But he
was buying them himself and not enabling his em-
ployees to buy them. So we told him we were not
interested in selling. We were very clear that we
wanted to target a certain customer base and we stuck
to that. Moreover, we said women have to be the co-
owners of the unit unless there was no adult woman
in the family. We said that people should not have
another house and that we will not do bulk sales or
speculative sales. These were very important moral
choices we had to make to retain our original purpose.
You asked whether our other partners/shareholders
supported this. I would say yes on many of these counts
but on some other counts, there was a lot of debate.
For example, at some point in time, when losses were
mounting (today we have accumulated loss of over Rs
10 crores in Janaadhar) we said that’s the price to pay
if you take a long term view of building enterprises. The
first three years is a tuition fee; you have to be willing
to pay the price to know what you are about. Losses are
not a reason to change business models; losses are a
reflection of the fact that you are learning something.
Have patience, results will follow, as it happened in
Janalakshmi. There was tension because the way out
would have been to sell the two bedroom units at Rs. 15
lakhs, make money, and go back to our moral agenda on
the next project. But we said no, we are not doing it.
Several others had done it and eventually moved out of
this space, because when the money and return-on-
investment clock is ticking, it is very hard to stay the
course. Unfortunately, this is where the government
does not get it right. They don’t understand that time is
money. Every time they delay plan sanctions or some-
thing else, the only way the developer can compensate
for uncertainty e and this is classic finance e is greater
returns. And if I don’t have a social agenda why should I
even try and do this?
We have had very good partners. Apart from Sterling
Developers, we partnered with Venkataramanan Asso-
ciates, a much respected architecture firm, who were
stimulated intellectually and professionally by our
vision, which gave them the opportunity to go beyond
the mainstream. But the engagement of many of our
other partners is limited, when compared to the
engagement of the Foundation.
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faced so far and what were the key decisions?
RR: If I had to synthesize it, I would say that while the
conversation about affordable housing tends to be
focussed on cost of construction and so on, the real
challenges are about knowing who the customer is and
ensuring that we can address the issues related to
customer acquisition and customer servicing. Associ-
ated with that is to figure out how we can enable cus-
tomers to get mortgages.
The other big issue is the role of the government and
plan sanctions. That was also a big learning for us. For
example, any reasonable size project has to have a
civic amenity site. Broadly, these civic amenities are a
school, healthcare centre and so on and 10% of the land
is allotted to these amenities. In our 12 acre plot 1.2
acres were set aside in the plan itself. The design that
you give for plan sanction has to contain the location of
your civic amenities. In Karnataka you have to surren-
der the civic amenity site to the government, to the
planning authority. Just to walk you through the eco-
nomics, we paid 12 crores for 12 acres, and gave 1.2
acres or so back to the government, to the Bangalore
Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA)
e it is a legal transfer.
And here is the paradoxical part of it. We wanted to
build our civic amenities as soon as possible because
our value proposition to our customers was that there
was going to be a school, a primary healthcare centre
and so on. But in Karnataka, in order for me to build
there, I would have to lease this land back from the
government and then get a sanction to build those
amenities. And, in order for me to lease it back and get
this land, I have to get a completion certificate for the
rest of my project. That meant I had to have finished
the project first, my customers would have to buy the
units and move in even before I started to construct the
amenities! How is that possible? If I promise my
customer that there will be an operational school by
the time he moves in, the only way to have that happen
is to allow me to build it right away. The building of the
residential units and the civic amenities has to be
concurrent.
The logic for this policy is because of the following. A
civic amenity site is possibly the most abused piece of
land used for mainstream real estate development. The
civic amenity site is meant not only for the people you
are constructing the houses for but for the general
public as well. That means it should be at the edge of
your property. What most mainstream developers do is
to locate it in the middle of their property so that it
becomes available only to the people on the site. They
build a club house, swimming pool, and so on. So, this is
the typical government response to circumvent abuse
of the provision for the public amenity.
SM/RT: So what can the government do? What can be
some of the enabling policies?
RR: One aspect of the policy enabler is land. Theoret-
ically, affordable housing is an obligation of the gov-
ernment. The government can deliver affordablehousing in two ways e build it themselves as the State
or enable public-private partnership. If the government
does not build, it has an obligation to provide the basic
raw material which is the land. However, we under-
stand that this is a tricky area and is liable to be
abused. So we are happy to acquire land indepen-
dently. But the government needs to come in and
certify afterwards that the land has been acquired
through proper channels. This is important because in
our case we found that we had to contend with the
claims of the original land owners in the village,
because of the way land is held under the law, even
though we had a legally air-tight case. They could still
go to the court and get a stay order on the construc-
tion. Further, parcels of land also come with a history
of public use. For instance, the parcels of land may
include portions classified as “kharab” land (land that is
not cultivable) for which one does not pay, or a dry lake
bed which does not show up obviously in the topog-
raphy. These are often misused by builders and could
become a bone of contention or irritants between the
builders and the local populace thereby introducing
avenues for rent seeking. Mainstream developers seem
to have figured a way around this.
SM/RT: What should be the role of the government
here?
RR: In case of public housing, where the state has an
agenda, the government has an obligation to act as a
facilitator. First, the state has to come in and say that if
you want to do affordable housing and you buy a
legitimate piece of land, I will protect you. Second,
with regard to plan sanctions, the government should
have a time-bound process and provide a single-window
clearance for it. Why is it that industrial policy has
single window clearance and housing does not? Third,
with respect to civic amenity sites, if I am going to build
an affordable housing project (this could be qualified
appropriately so that it doesn’t get abused), and if the
civic amenities are a primary school and primary
healthcare centre, give me automatic clearance. The
government must have a legitimate affordable housing
policy based on some criteria and once those criteria
are met, the clearance should be given. This clearance
should be given to the project and not to the developer.
Such tweaks have to be done to the policy. These
learnings e one, about the customers and two, about
the role of the state e were the tuition fees that we
paid. We are very clear now that we will not start a new
project unless all these get done.
SM/RT: What next? Do you have plans of scaling this?
Are you starting some other projects?
RR: Along this journey, apart from learning from our
mistakes, we have also learnt how to build a process
driven organization, how to build an enterprise
resource planning (ERP) system for something like this.
We have now custom built a process framework for
Janaadhar e that’s our competence. We have a
detailed process document which is multi-
departmental and which anticipates many of the
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technology platforms that can enable us to go forward.
These were the information technology (IT) related
learnings from our first project. It will take us a year to
implement all the modules of the ERP system. Our
phase two will integrate some of these.
We have three projects that we are looking to go ahead
on. One is workers’ housing for an automobile com-
pany, second is industrial housing for a manufacturing
SEZ outside Chennai, which has tens of thousands of
blue collar employees, but with no housing. This could
result in slums outside the SEZ in the next five years. So
we made a winewin proposal for affordable housing
there. The third project is a typical private sector
project like Janaadhar Shubha, but in another state.
We have also expanded our organization chart to
include someone who can engage on policy issues. Our
goal for the next three to four years is to create the
institutional capacity to build about 5000 units of
affordable housing a year distributed across three
categories of affordable housing. We are very clear that
we will be a hardcore affordable housing company.
SM/RT: We understand that you have been quite
traditional in terms of construction method and
material after exploring alternatives.
RR: We explored this a lot. We went, for example, to
the largest housing company in the world, Homex,
which is based out of Mexico. We also explored what
others in the field in India, in Malaysia and Australia are
doing and we concluded that in order to effect trans-
formational change on the engineering and construc-
tion specifications, you need to have scale. You have to
be able to build 10 million square feet a year. We don’t
think that we have that scale yet in Janaadhar.
The way we are approaching this is as follows: There
are two benefits of transformational change that can
accrue e a cost of construction benefit and a time to
market benefit. The benefit of cost of construction
cannot accrue until we get to scale. Time to market is
not a desirable benefit for our customers because given
their circumstances e school going children and their
jobs e they need time to transition and relocate. So,
time to market while being a useful variable of new
technology is not a valuable variable for our customers.
Once we get to scale we can do a lot of things across
the spectrum of our projects. But that’s not the core
competency that we need to focus on for the next
three years.
SM/RT: Will it help if the government could give you a
30-year lease or 40 year lease on the land?
RR: Two reasons why I feel it may not work e one is,
people want ownership. First, India is not a country
that has lease hold for residential use. It is a rare
occurrence. However, it is worth exploring. This is the
time when a lot of experimentation must happen
because there are no models that have demonstrated
that we can deliver on some scale. Second, there is also
a role for the state to do things directly; we can do 300
sq feet but even that will cost four and a half lakhs.There are a lot of people who cannot afford that sum.
What do you say to them? The state has to do something
for them. It is the state’s obligation and they are
missing in action right now.
SM/RT: How can institutions like the Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore (IIMB) and centres like IIMB-
Century Real Estate Research Initiative (IIMB-CRERI)
help the sector on a longer term basis?
RR: I haven’t thought about this question very much so
this is off the cuff. I would say, first, let us get the State
to spell out what they are doing for affordable housing.
Institutions like IIMB and centres such as IIMB-CRERI can
act as a convening forum to bring market players and
the State together. They can push the government for
regular meetings, press for tangible results and action-
taken reports.
Second, the Union government announces different
kinds of policies but it doesn’t track them or facilitate
them adequately. There are three policy interventions
which the Union government has recently announced e
interest rate subsidy for housing for urban poor,
Affordable Housing in Partnership (AHIP), and Rajiv
Awas Yojana (RAY). But access to these schemes is
unclear e none of these are available on the ground.
We have to make our business plan on assumptions
because adequate information and guidance is not
available. The government must also create a conver-
gence mechanism for the many powerful institutions to
operate and become visible. This is another potential
area of engagement.
There are other problems such as equity funds and in-
vestors not coming into this area. When we have to raise
money for newprojects, it is hard because they look at us
and say, “You are a loss making company”. One of the
biggest reasons why investors are not coming into this
space is that you don’t get plan sanctions. If your centre
can get the State and investors together, you will hear
directly from the investors why they are not coming. You
could also get into innovation, scale, technology and
other areas. But compliments to you for having set up
such a centre and having made a beginning.
SM/RT: Can you speak about the challenge of building
your organization itself because it is not very easy to
attract talent to such organizations. Could you reflect
on the leadership and team building challenges at
Janaadhar?
RR: The challenge organizations such as ours face is in
getting the leadership to move from a concept to an
operational entity, and then surviving the first strug-
gles. Taking on such a challenge begins with having
remarkable people who are willing to take the risk to
join at the very start. I have been incredibly lucky in
this e Raghu Srinivasan, a veteran banker, and I first
connected almost 10 years ago, when I shared the
vision for Janalakshmi when it was a fledgling. To his
great credit, he not only completely bought into the
idea, but made it his own. He came on board as the first
CEO of Janalakshmi, and then built the core manage-
ment team over the next few years e a remarkable
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years between 2006 and 2010, and didn’t give up.
Chinu, as we call him, then handed off the CEO role to
Radhakrishnan, who is now Janalakshmi’s MD-CEO, and
is now doing the same thing with Janaadhar. As an Ex-
ecutive Director, he has brought on a terrific team led
by Arvind Bhatnagar as COO, and is putting the building
blocks of the enterprise. This is the most important
phase, of getting the DNA right. So this piece is critical
e getting the first group of outstanding people with
competence, commitment and integrity to share the
vision.
SM/RT: Can you reflect on what the process has meant
for you?
RR: Our singular advantage has been that we are a
purpose driven organization and to me that is the most
powerful thing. The most powerful currency we have is
that as a promoter, as the chairman of the company, I
don’t have any skin in the game and it’s hard for people
to actually believe that’s true. Only people who get
engaged will realize this. I have been a creature of the
market for most of my career. The big question for me
was to figure out whether greed is the only driving force
behind making a successful market based institution.
The positives of the market are innovation, customer
centricity, acquiring talent, getting scale and so on. So
to harness all of those positives, is greed the only cur-
rency? Why do we need that? I am not motivated by
greed. What if I am motivated by only those positive
things? So it’s a test for me and it’s now been a twelve-
year test. And I am as driven, as hungry for doing
things, for building a scalable institution, as I was in my
private sector job.
I think purpose eats greed for lunch, but you have to
communicate that when people come in. Every one ofus dreams of being a part of a narrative that is bigger
than our life. Ultimately we ask the question, what is
my life about? If I can be successful in a narrow sense
for myself, that’s fine. I checked that box. What
happens after I checked that box? Can I make the
narrative of my life something larger than my life?
What purpose driven organizations have to do is to give
the people that opportunity. Are we going to be per-
fect? No! But we have all been searching for the per-
fect organization. It doesn’t exist but we need to keep
challenging each other and lead by example. I am not
a micro-manager. I love building organizations. We
have seen this in Janalakshmi, we have seen this in
Janaagraha. The first 5e10 years are really hard but
that’s the price to pay. You have to lead from the
front, you have to ask yourself, when that tough stuff
comes up, are you willing to make hard choices and
not compromise. If you struggle and do not compro-
mise it becomes a part of your DNA. So over time
people come in and it becomes like a bee-hive. You
send out a certain set of pheromones which signal
what you are about and then people get attracted to
it. But you have to be very demanding. I am a data
driven guy. All decisions are made on data. So there is
no subjectivity, there are no instinct based decisions.
Then people automatically feel there is symmetry. If
you make a decision and you are wrong, you get the
data to say you are wrong, pull back and go to some
other place. So you keep doing that over and over
again. It becomes a part of your culture. We are a
young organization in Janaadhar. We are probably only
three years away from institutionalizing our capacity
and there is fun in doing that.
SM/RT: Thank you very much for a rich and insightful
conversation.
